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World Hotels - Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941
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List Price: $18.00
Our Price: $12.24
Your Save: $ 5.76 ( 32% )
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Manufacturer: Penguin (Non-Classics)
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Average Customer Rating:  
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Binding: Paperback
Dewey Decimal Number: 909
EAN: 9780143113720
ISBN: 0143113720
Label: Penguin (Non-Classics)
Manufacturer: Penguin (Non-Classics)
Number Of Items: 1
Number Of Pages: 656
Publication Date: 2008-05-27
Publisher: Penguin (Non-Classics)
Studio: Penguin (Non-Classics)
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Editorial Reviews:
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The newest immensely original undertaking from the historian who gave us the defining two-volume portrait of Hitler, Fateful Choices puts Ian Kershaw’s analytical and storytelling gifts on dazzling display. From May 1940 to December 1941, the leaders of the world’s six major powers made a series of related decisions that determined the final outcome of World War II and shaped the course of human destiny. As the author examines the connected stories of these profound choices, he restores a sense of drama and contingency to this pivotal moment, producing one of the freshest, most important books on World War II in years—one with powerful contemporary relevance.
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Spotlight customer reviews:
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Customer Rating: 
Summary: Great Info, The Writing is a Tad Dry
Comment: Interesting look at ten decisions made by Hitler. Stalin, Churchill, Mussolini, Tojo and Roosevelt in the 1940-41 timeframe that made WWII what it was. The info was better than the telling (a tad dry) and the author's 'what if' stuff was on thin ice, but there was excellent info in here.
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Summary: Great book and well written
Comment: I lived thru this area and like today information was subject to national bias so this was the rest of the story particularly the divided ideas in Japan.
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Summary: When the world hung in the balance
Comment: For those familiar with Kershaw primarily through his definitive two-volume biography of Adolf Hitler, 'Fateful Choices' might seem, at first glance, like a comparatively light-weight book with a 'what-if' gimmick at its core: what if England had sought a negotiated peace with Germany, what if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor, etc. But Kershaw is not a light-weight historian, and he uses the book's structure as a series of teaching moments about key turning points in the course of the war. His discussion of the debates inside Churchill's war cabinet are fascinating reading for those familiar only with Churchill's public pronouncements that England would never back down: Kershaw weighs in on the various arguments of the participants and even gives a fair hearing to the reasoning of those who were ultimately on the wrong side of history. The book also brings up less well known but equally fascinating turns of events such as Italy's unilateral decision to invade Greece, which opened up yet another front in an already sprawling world conflict. This book is probably best read by people who already have a certain familiarity with the major events and figures of the period, but it would also be highly recommended for students enrolled in college courses on modern European history, where outcomes are all too often presented as fait accompli. Kershaw shows that history frequently turns on individual decisions made by individual people, and he does so with vigor, authority, and grace.
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Summary: Very interesting viewpoint on WW II history
Comment: I have read many WWII military history books, and this was a nice complement in that it provides some of the background that led to the action in WWII. Well-written and researched.
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Summary: The reasons why
Comment: This is a book which looks at ten decisions taken between 1940 and 1941 which affected the course of the Second World War. Rather than an alternative history it looks at each decision and the logic for it. It is worthwhile looking at one example to see the books method.
For instance Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union in retrospect seems outrageous folly. Look at what happened to Charles XII of Sweden and Napoleon. Both led armies into the depth of Russia and were defeated by "General Winter." The size of the Soviet Union made landing a knock out blow impossible and Germany was drawn into a war of attrition which it lost just like Charles and Napoleon.
The genius of this book is to show how in the context of 1941 things looked different. Germany had defeated France in 1940 and occupied its north. Britain although undefeated was not able to put an army on European soil which could match Germany's. Germany (which had absorbed Austria) had as allies Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland. In the First World War Germany with the support of the Austrian Empire had been able to defeat Imperial Russia whilst it had the majority of its army on the Western Front. It now could devote the majority of its army to the Russian operation and had more allies plus the resources of Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Balkans, France and Denmark. Thus in 1941 Germany looked back on the victory in 1917 knowing that it was infinity stronger being able to put an army of 3 million into the field. Germany also felt that its army was highly trained and operationally streets ahead of the Soviets who had struggled to defeat tiny Finland.
In fact the conventional wisdom in 1941 was that the Soviets would be defeated quickly and that Germany would then have a vast new colonial empire that could be used to build up its air force and navy to defeat Britain to ward off America.
Kershaw shoes how Hitler grappled with the problem of what to do after the defeat of France. To invade England was well nigh impossible because of its naval strength. If the Germans could get an army ashore there would be no way to supply it and it would be defeated. To build up naval superiority if possible would take years. To wage a Mediterranean strategy was also difficult. The logical first step would be to seize Gibraltar so that Britain could be denied access to the Mediterranean and Egypt would be isolated. This would also give some chance for uniting the Italian and German Fleets. The problem was how to make up a coalition of forces? Spain would only enter the war if it got the French colonial possessions in North Africa. This would alienate the Vichy Regime and possibly the French Fleet would join the British. All in all, although it now seems weird to Hitler the invasion of the Soviet Union was the easiest strategy and the most likely to lead to victory.
In a similar way Britains decision to fight on in 1940 seems to be an act of gallant folly. One that was good for the world and reflective of Churchillian bravery. Yet in the context of the time there was some discussion about seeking terms. The reality was that any terms were likely to simply weaken Britain's military position and lead not to peace but an eventual subjugation to Germany. Fighting on was the only real option.
The brilliance of this book is that it is able to put each of these 10 decisions into the context of the time and to show the mind set of those who made the decision. It is not only a powerful work but also something of a page turner.
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