|
World Hotels - The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947

|
List Price: $18.00
Our Price: $12.24
Your Save: $ 5.76 ( 32% )
Availability: Usually ships in 24 hours
Manufacturer: Penguin (Non-Classics)
|
Average Customer Rating:     

|
|
Binding: Paperback Dewey Decimal Number: 909 EAN: 9780140196153 ISBN: 0140196153 Label: Penguin (Non-Classics) Manufacturer: Penguin (Non-Classics) Number Of Items: 1 Number Of Pages: 608 Publication Date: 2000-10-01 Publisher: Penguin (Non-Classics) Release Date: 2000-10-03 Studio: Penguin (Non-Classics)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Editorial Reviews:
|
Based entirely on unpublished primary sources, Tsering Shakya's groundbreaking history of modern Tibet shatters the popular conception of the country as an isolated Shangri--la unaffected by broader international developments. Shakya gives a balanced, blow-by-blow account of Tibet's ongoing struggle to maintain its independence and safeguard its cultural identity while being sandwiched between the heavyweights of Asian geopolitics: Britain, India, China, and the United States.
With thorough documentation, Shakya details the Chinese depredations of Tibet, and reveals the failures of the Tibetan leadership's divided strategies. Rising above the simplistic dualism so often found in accounts of Tibet's contested recent history, The Dragon in the Land of Snows lucidly depicts the tragedy that has befallen Tibet and identifies the conflicting forces that continue to shape the aspirations of the Tibetan people today.
|
|
|
Spotlight customer reviews:
|
Customer Rating:      Summary: Tis a shandeh* Comment: My education in Tibetan history reads like the serial cliff hangers of a tragic soap opera. Looking backward from the present, it is easy to see the Chinese invasion of Tibet as the cause of the suffering the Tibetans have experienced in the last hundred years. But that is all too simple. Piecing together the history one looks for people to blame for the unfortunate outcomes at each stage of Tibet in the 20th century. The Tibetan Diaspora would point to the Chinese as the culprits and, god knows, the Chinese have behaved abominably, but the story has many sides to it. Like the Palestinis, and Kurds (till the first Gulf war), Tibetans, no matter how beloved the Dalai Lama has become, are the forgotten of the world, abandoned by nations who stand for humanity and beaten on by more powerful neighbors. To see how my thinking has unfolded as I have read each episode of Tibetan history look at my reviews of Goldstein, Iyer and Thurman. A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist StateA History of Modern Tibet, volume 2: The Calm before the Storm: 1951-1955 (Philip E. Lilienthal Books)The Open Road: The Global Journey of the Fourteenth Dalai LamaWhy the Dalai Lama Matters: His Act of Truth as the Solution for China, Tibet, and the World MacKay's three volumes are difficult to get a hold of as is McGovern's interesting book, "To Tibet in Disguise." History of Tibet (Curzon in Association With Iias, 9)
Shakya's book fills in the history from '47 to the early `90's. The part until 1955 pretty much parallels Goldstein's History of Tibet, adding detail from the Tibetan side but leaving out some of the subtleties of power struggles within China which affected Tibet. Shakya suggests that he doesn't read Chinese so his coverage is limited to Chinese documents translated into Tibetan.
The episodes in this tragic soap opera begin with the plausible assertion by China of suzerainty over Tibet which may have consisted in no more than formal obeisance although there were mercantile, monastic and regional groups who saw Chinese hegemony as a counterbalance to Central Tibetan dominance. With the fall of the Manchu, Tibet was effectively independent until the invasion of 1950 although no nation recognized that independence. Because China was weak and Britain distracted by war, it was not until the Communist victory in China that China could enforce its claim to Tibet, and they did so by invading the semi-autonomous regions of eastern Tibet whose loyalty to the center was very questionable. As Goldstein points out conservative forces in Tibet from the 1920s on prevented preparation for the onslaught that was clearly inevitable.
The episode from 1951 until the Tibetan uprising in 1959 is a curious one. Sweeping the eastern areas of Kham and Amdo into China proper, the Chinese militarily occupied all of Tibet and treated it with kid gloves claiming they would not begin social change until the Tibetan people were ready. The Chinese courted the monasteries, used the established government to rule, and wined and dined the Dalai Lama in China. They even encouraged the Dalai Lama not to make social changes the people were not ready for. The Chinese poured resources into Tibet hiring contractors and many laborers to build the roads connecting Tibet to China. While some merchants prospered and peasants had new found cash, the central government resisted changes the Chinese wanted to make and when resources became tight in China and they cut back on subsidies to Tibet the Tibetans were resentful. Although there was mixed monastic and aristocratic cooperation, Tibetans as a whole disliked the Chinese presence.
When the Chinese began to institute reforms in Kham and Amdo akin to the changes they were making elsewhere in China, the locals resisted. The Khampas objected to land redistribution. Collectivization of land would foremost affect monasteries which in eastern Tibet housed fifty thousand monks and were the largest landowners. This attack on religious institutions, despite the fact they exploited the peasantry, was universally disliked. The author claims there had never been any peasant uprisings against monasteries--a claim whose historical accuracy may rest on the fact that monastic record keepers had no interest in recording any incidences of the same. To control potential resistance, the Chinese asked that weapons be turned in. But the Khampas like American rednecks refused this, and when the Chinese began collectivizing and settling nomads in 1955 serious fighting erupted. On one occasion when both fighters and civilians sought refuge in a monastery, the Chinese bombarded it killing innocent people. Some survivors and other guerillas retreated into western Tibet. It is interesting that the central government did nothing to support the rebels. Its response was a mix of fear that the Chinese would then attack Lhasa and a traditional feeling that the Khampas were inferiors.
The presence of Khampas in Central Tibet and some who fled to India had a number of effects. The exile community in India now had champions and so encouraged the Khampa. The areas south east of Lhasa to which most of the refugees and guerillas came felt imposed upon. They had little enough food and the Khampas strained their resources. The locals were also offended at some banditry committed by the Khampas. In Lhasa the Khampas found allies among some who opposed the Chinese. Opposition came not only from upper classes and monks but also ordinary people who had rarely been involved in politics before and whose opinions were never solicited by past Tibetan rulers.
In 1956 the Dalai Lama visited India and there was an effort made by the refugees to keep him there. Nehru and the Americans wanted him to return as he did. Nehru so as not to offend the Chinese with whom he wanted to co-exist and the American because they felt the Dalai Lama would cause more trouble for the Chinese from within the country. Because of the growing resistance to change in Eastern Tibet factions within the Chinese government reevaluated the forced social changes blaming "Han Chauvinism" for lack of appreciation of Tibetan culture giving rise to resistance. The Chinese were willing to ease up. At the same time the CIA began to support the Khampas injecting the Cold War into the mix. In 1958 the Khampas were successful in some raids causing the Chinese army to launch an effective counteroffensive. "...the relationship between Lhasa and Kham were at best uneasy, and at the worst, hostile." If things had not come to a head, "civil war might have broken out between the Lhasa regime and the Khampas." In 1959 the Tibetan government was paralyzed and the Dalai Lama "very near despair." In anticipation of the "great Monlam" festival, the gathering of which involved thousands of monks in Lhasa tensions mounted. This event had been the occasion of previous outbursts. The Chinese prepared for violence and some Tibetan monks and soldiers gathered to discuss possible threats to the Dalai Lama from the Chinese. In the tense atmosphere the Dalai Lama was invited to a performance at the Chinese military camp to which he intended to go fearing nothing although some advisors urged him not to. What unfolded was, in its immediate causes, completely unnecessary but could later be seen as a response to the inevitable. A rumor spread that the Dalai Lama would be kidnapped by the Chinese. The rumor was abetted by officials who did not want the DL to go. Without going into detail which Shakya covers well, the crowds gather, brutally murdered a Chamdo Tibetan official for wearing modern clothes and Chinese cap, dragged his body around Lhasa and severely beat another Tibetan official. Other high Tibetan officials attending the ceremony knew little of what was going on while the Dalai Lama and those surrounding did not know how to respond to the riots. The DL still wanted to go. The next day the crowds began to hit Chinese targets. The crowds felt betrayed by Tibetan officialdom. It was not until a week after the first riot that the Dalai Lama fled. Confusion reigned with some officials supporting the rioters while other trying to calm them. Tibetans often used the tactic of not responding when pressed. In 1904 the 13th Dalai Lama fled hoping that British demands would go away. The 1959 riots seem like another such instance. The Chinese aware of their military superiority waited a week before reacting, hoping things would quiet down. Then on the 17th they began sporadic shelling, reclaimed Lhasa and enforced their occupation of the rest of Tibet. This was a turning point. There was no longer any reason to treat Tibet with kid gloves.
The author does not address the question of whether the Dalai Lama should have fled, but it lurks in the background. The subsequent history of the Chinese occupation might suggest that to preserve Buddhism and the Dalai Lama's religious authority, he was right to have gone into exile. Tibet suffered from all of the various left and rightward turns that plagued China while Mao lived and other oppressions in the years afterwards. The Great Leap Forward, Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom, the Socialist Education Movement, the Cultural Revolution and the turn toward capitalism, Getting Wealthy is Good, all left their imprint on Tibet. In the 1950s the Panchen Lama returned from exile despite Lhasa's attempts to stop, then diminish, him. Because of his cooperation with the Chinese he could thought to have been a Quisling but in fact he was able to soften some Chinese actions which earned him imprisonment for many years when the Anti-Revisionist Campaign of 1964 attacked feudal lords and nationalism. When he emerged from prison in 1978 and house arrest in the 1980s he again took up the role of moderator. What would have been the Dalai Lama's fate? There is a successful émigré community and the Dalai Lama is a world icon. As far as I know the diaspora does not lionize the 10th Panchen Lama. But he stayed, shared the fate of his countrymen and did his best.
Two threads now emerge in Tibetan history. One is the tremendous suffering of the Tibetan people under the Chinese. The second is the role of the exiled Dalai Lama as a world figure and his effect on events in Tibet. In brief the Chinese tried to eliminate nationalism within China as an advanced step in the socialization of society. Tibetans suffered attempts to destroy their traditional way of life, especially during the Cultural Revolution. Collectivization, destruction of most monasteries and endless purges and reeducation depended on the particular shifts among Chinese political factions. It all seems to have been a miserable failure. And while some of the rebels of 1959 languished in jail, while others were killed, the devastation of production, and brutalization of suspected opponents during various swings, left Tibetans dulled and withdrawn. Whether they suffered worse than the Chinese in China is hard to say. But it was all visited upon them by people whom they regarded as alien conquerors. It is a sad testimony to ideological blindness and human cruelty. It smacks of the Crusader conquerors of Jerusalem, the Conquistadors, the enslaving Vikings, Mongol hordes, the British slavers, King Leopold, Russian collectivization or Nazi occupiers of Eastern Europe. Somewhere in the whole process, the Chinese hoped they would break Tibetan's spirit and develop cadres loyal to the motherland who would value production, socialist equality, and modernization more than their traditional religious past. How much that succeeded is hard to assess, and Shakya, like other authors, feels that despite all the Tibetans had been through when conditions were liberalized they went back to supporting monasteries and sending their sons to be monks. The latter may have been as much because the Chinese never offered Tibetan youths much economic opportunity as commitment to the faith. Nonetheless liberalization in China, when applied to Tibet, led to resurgence of religion and resistance to Chinese domination. What followed was marshal law, harassment, censorship, limitations on monasticism and forbidding any expression of devotion to the Dalai Lama.
Added to that, in the 1990s, was a policy of intense economic development of Tibet. As the entrepreneurial spirit was let lose in China, Tibet was included. This led Chinese with more training and initiative to flood into Tibet and begin to dominate the Tibetan economy. Whether the flow of Chinese was government policy to overwhelm the Tibetans or simply a result of market forces (the Chinese did have formal restrictions but as in China itself there was no holding back the tide). So we have come to the current situation: Tibet with suppressed nationalism, Chinese economic and, at least in the cities, increasing demographic dominance, and a diaspora of 1/60th the population of Tibet but with a significant world audience and a claim to all areas in which ethnic Tibetans live. Because the book ends in the 1990s we are at an episode before which there is impact of the extraction of Tibetan resources by the Chinese---mining, electricity etc. Also we know little of how the Tibetans participated in the economic changes. They can't all be laborers and peasant farmers. The details of economic history need another episode of the soap.
That leaves us with the Dalai Lama and the diaspora. It has been a mixed experience. From being held in check by India until the China/India wars of 1962, the Dalai Lama from the early 1980s on has moved himself and Tibetan culture on to the world stage. From the Nobel prize, to Congressional medals and thousands of Westerners practicing Tibetan Buddhism, the DL and the diaspora have truly become world heroes. Their history of negotiation with the Chinese and ability to affect affairs of Tibet have had their ups and downs. While exiles may have encouraged protests in Tibet during the DL's address to the US congress in 1989 and may even have an underground in Tibet, lots of Tibetans got killed. As for influencing Chinese policy or engineering Tibetan autonomy, the DL seams to have gotten nowhere, and despite claims of endorsement from countries or political parties, the Chinese seem to know that they have to pay very little in the world for their domination of Tibet. No nation cares (nor have seemingly ever cared) enough about Tibetan sovereignty to put pressure on China ---and who could anyway given China's emerging economic clout since the mid 1980s. Is the Dalai Lama relevant? As of the end of the book in the `90s, it is hard to say. Maybe I have to see the next chapter of the soap. I certainly will look for a source to fill me in. Meanwhile what would it mean for the Dalai Lama to return? His autonomy, in real terms, would mean independence for the Tibetans. Given their repression, nothing less would do for people who have so suffered under the Chinese. So we have or will soon have a situation like elsewhere in the world: Fiji, there are more imported Indians than native Fijians. Capitalism, of course, dictates that the successful are entitled: Indians in Africa, Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia, Jews in Palestine and New York, Cubans in Miami, etc. Not easy to unravel. The Dalai Lama wants to send the Chinese home, but what if China really dropped its Communist bosses and became democratic. Could Tibetans reasonably expel the Chinese or would there need to be affirmative action for the Tibetans. Where is the next book covering the details of Tibetans in Tibet from the `90s on and what about an economic history? I am searching. Meanwhile read this book for a good coverage of the post 1955 episodes.
Charlie Fisher author of Dismantling Discontent: Buddha's Way Through Darwin's World
(* shandeh is the Yiddish word for shame)
Customer Rating:      Summary: Tibet Comment: Easy and concise. The myths are removed, and you are presented with a unbais history of Tibet.
Customer Rating:      Summary: Want to know about Tibet? Read this book Comment: The Tibet issue is totally politicized. Western academics can't get access to Tibet and Tibetan archives unless they kowtow to the Communist authorities in their writing. Then there's the Hollywood types who frequent Dharmasala and do their own version of kowtowing to the sometimes bizarre collection of people surrounding the Dalai Lama. Tsering Shakya's book is an important contribution because it represents fair-minded scholarship at its best. It's an easy read as well.
Customer Rating:      Summary: Great info Comment: This book is a bombshell in the literature on Tibet. Not because it should be considered overly controversial or anything of that nature, but because it is so comprehensive in it's treatment of the historical timeline of Tibet from shortly before the Chinese takeover to the present day. It also adds much new information to a subject that suffers from a considerable lack of scholarly material when compared to other contentious ethnic issues.
All of the previous reviewers have it spot-on in that the author has taken pains to be as objective as possible. I think the only way the book suffers may be in that Shakya was so bent on being objective that his writing style comes off a bit bland and laborious, but it certainly gets the job done, and then some.
Customer Rating:      Summary: Indispensibable resource on modern Tibet Comment: Tsering Shakya's account of Tibet since (and shortly before) the Chinese invasion is a fair and open-minded, and well-researched history. At times the writing does become sodden, but Shakya's presentation of the many forces at work in the sad history of the Chinese occupation of Tibet shows that while China has committed crime upom crime, elements of Tibetan society have aided, abetted and , in some cases, participated Chinese domination and terror. While Tibetan monastic and aristocratic circles come under considerable criticism, one also understands that this was a titanic mismatch to begin with. The international community gets considerable critical coverage, in particular Nehru's India and Great Britain. The bottom line behind this history is how ill-equipped Tibet was for the cataclysms of the mid- to- late- 20th century, and how their reactions varied. Exhaustive but very readable. If you are interested in Tibet at all, this book is a mandatury palliative to a diet that leans too much on the spiritual side of Tibetan culture and thought.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|